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The Japanese trade surplus has been one of the three key reasons for trade 
imbalances of the last few years. The size of the surplus is now about two 
thirds of the U.S. trade deficit and exceeds the German surplus by a wide 
margin. The Japanese bilateral trade surplus against the U.S. is about one 
third of the U.S.  deficit. Despite  the sharp appreciation of the yen  since 
1985, the  surplus  did  not  start to decrease  until  1987. In this paper we 
analyze the causes of Japan's recent trade (or current) account surplus and 
the persistence  of the surplus in the face of large corrections in exchange 
rates. The major focus is on the surplus of the 1980s, which  far exceeds 
earlier surpluses in any conceivable measure. However,  attempts are made 
to  place  the  analysis  in  a proper long-term  perspective  to  examine  the 
unique problem of the 1980s. 
A distinguishing characteristic  of the current account surplus of the 1980s 
is its high  correlation with  domestic  and foreign fiscal variables. Histori- 
cally, the current account has most corresponded with private investment.1 
Therefore, the analysis of the current account surplus of the 1980s requires 
an explanation of a correlation between investment and the current account 
that is weaker than in earlier periods. 
In the  1980s, the  most  popular view  of the  correlation between  fiscal 
policy and the current account recognizes a causal relationship between the 
two.2 Many people  have argued, using a version of the Mundell-Fleming 
model,  that  the  U.S.  fiscal  expansion  and  Japanese  contraction  have 
created the imbalance by their effects on the exchange rate. The discussion 
of the  paper revolves  around this view  (the M-F view),  noting  whether 
1. Importance of investment  behavior  to the  explanation  of the  current account  has  been 
stressed by Sachs [1981]. 
2. See, for example,  Ueda [1985]. 218  UEDA 
departures from it are necessary in order to explain actual current account 
movements. 
The M-F view  seems  to explain the course of the world economy  in the 
1980s fairly well,  with  the  exception  of exchange  rate movements  since 
1985.3  In fact, no simple model seems to be capable of explaining asset price 
movements  in the 1980s, such as exchange rates and interest rates. We thus 
focus on the goods  market, the current account, investment  and savings, 
taking the movements  in assets prices as exogenous.  We also work on the 
assumption  that Japan is a small country mainly for reason of tractability. 
Hence,  the  paper does  not  analyze  the relationship between  U.S.  fiscal 
policy,  exchange  rates  and  U.S.  economic  expansion.  In  most  cases  a 
relationship is assumed. 
The approach of the paper is agnostic more than testing of the M-F view 
or alternative models.  We try to identify the major causes of fluctuations of 
the current account and  saving-investment  balances,  both by estimating 
simple behavioral equations and by more casually inspecting  data. 
A major departure from the M-F view is the Ricardian  view of the effects 
of fiscal policy.  Under this view,  fiscal policy exerts a minor effect on the 
current account. Although tests of the neutrality theorem using macro data 
are bound  to be inconclusive,  we  argue that the Ricardian view  is incon- 
sistent with movements  in Japanese macroeconomic variables. 
A more useful neoclassical approach to the current account might be one 
which  emphasizes  the  effects  of  prospective  income  and  productivity 
changes  on savings and investment.  A prospective decline in productivity 
and  income  may  decrease  investment  more  than  savings  and  create a 
current account surplus. A major possible cause of decreases in productiv- 
ity and income in the 1970s is the rise in oil prices. We, therefore, examine 
the relationship between  investment,  savings and the current account. We 
find  only  very  weak  evidence  of the  relationship for the  1980s. Conse- 
quently, we conclude that this perspective, would be somewhat  useful for 
understanding  long run movements  in Japanese savings and investment, 
but not the increase in the current account surplus in the 1980s. This part 
of the  paper,  in a sense,  addresses  the  question  of why  the  correlation 
between  the  current account  and  private investment  was  weak  in  the 
1980s. 
The M-F  model attributes  powerful  effects  of asset prices  on trade  flows 
and saving-investment  balances. A domestic fiscal contraction  improves 
current account  mainly  through  exchange  rate depreciation.  A  foreign 
fiscal  expansion  increases  net  savings  (savings  minus  investment)  by 
raising interest rates. A simple econometric analysis of the Japanese goods 
3. See, for example,  Sachs & Roubini [1987]. Japanese  Current  Account  Surplus  *  219 
market suggests  that the effects of asset prices are, though  not nil, fairly 
small.  This  suggests  that the  traditional Keynesian  income-expenditure 
mechanism  should  not be disgarded at least within a time span of a few 
years. 
The small exchange  rate effects on the current account and the impor- 
tance of the conventional  income-expenditure  mechanism  calls for some 
qualifications of  the  popular M-F view  of  the Japanese current account 
surplus.  First, the major shocks  to the Japanese goods  market that have 
generated  the surplus are the high growth of U.S.  expenditures  and the 
decline  in  oil  prices.  Second,  the  decreases  in  Japanese  government 
expenditures  are also important, but not to the extent  suggested  by the 
decline  in  the Japanese budget  deficit.  The  deficit was,  to a significant 
extent, a response to the U.S. economic expansion and oil prices decreases, 
as  unexpectedly  high  income  growth  increased  tax  collections  and/or 
decreased  the share of government  expenditures  in GNP.  Third, a large 
reduction in the surplus requires a major correction of the relative growth 
rates of  U.S.  and  Japanese  expenditures.  Without  this,  exchange  rates 
would have to change by considerable amounts, which is what we actually 
saw in 1985 and 1986. 
This paper is organized as follows: In section 1, we provide an overview 
of the Japanese current account. In section 2, we survey various approaches 
to the Japanese  current account,  especially  its behavior in the  1980s. In 
section 3, we estimate export and import equations on the one hand, and 
saving and investment  equations on the other. The estimation results are 
used  to clarify the causes of the current account surplus.  Section 4 offers 
some  further remarks on the current account. Section 5 summarizes  the 
conclusions  of the analysis. 
1. An Overview 
1.1 EXPORTS  AND IMPORTS 
Figure 1 shows  movements  in the trade balance (which is approximately 
the same as the current account for Japan), (the negative  of) oil imports, 
and the non-oil trade balance for the last three decades, all relative to GNP. 
We point out three important characteristics of the trade balance: first, in 
the 1950s and the early 1960s, the balance was mostly in deficit; second,  it 
began to improve in the mid-1960s, leading to a large surplus in the early 
1970s (the oil price increase in 1973-74 moved the trade balance into deficit 
for a brief period. But a large surplus reappeared in 1977-78, and was once 
more  reversed  by  the  oil  price  increase  in  1979-80); third,  large  and 
persistent surpluses emerged in the 1980s, exceeding those of the 1970s by 
a wide margin. 220  UEDA 
Figure  1 OIL  IMPORTS,  NON-OIL  & OVERALL  TRADE  BALANCE 
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We find that for the 1950s and 1960s, movements in the trade balance are 
mostly  explained by those in the non-oil balance, while  in the 1970s and 
1980s, it correlates increasingly with oil imports. The trade balance in the 
1970s and 1980s has been most affected by changes in oil imports. 
For the last two decades there has been a strong correlation between  the 
overall trade balance and  non-oil  balance,  suggesting  the importance  of 
exports. There has been a clear upward trend in the non-oil balance for the 
last two decades,  matching the upward trend in the overall balance. 
About two-thirds of the increase in total exports between  1980 and 1986 
can  be  explained  by  the  specific  increase  in  exports  to  the  U.S.  This 
certainly forces us  to examine  U.S.  variables in order to understand  the 
surge  in  exports.  Figure  2  looks  at  the  correlation between  the  real 
exchange  rate, the  U.S.-Japan expenditure  growth  differentials, and  the 
non-oil  trade balance. The real exchange  rate here is the U.S.  producers 
price  index  of  manufactured  goods  relative  to  Japanese  export  price. 
Despite  the recent sharp yen  appreciation, the real exchange  rate is just 
back at the level it was in 1980, and is still far above the 1973 or 1978 levels.4 
This reflects the high growth of productivity in the Japanese manufacturing 
4. The fact that the real exchange rate is now back at the 1980 level, while the trade balance is 
not,  suggests  that factors other than exchange rate movements  may have been the major 
cause of the increase in the surplus in the 1980s. Japanese  Current  Account  Surplus  ?  221 
sector relative to its U.S. competition. Both the exchange rate and the growth 
differential exhibit positive correlation with the trade balance, as expected. 
The distinctive feature of the 1980s is not only the sharp depredation of the 
yen,  but  the  fact that  the  U.S.  expenditure  growth  exceeded  Japanese 
expenditure growth, especially in 1983 and 1984-something  very unusual 
between  the two countries during the last two decades. 
1.2 SAVINGS  AND INVESTMENT 
We turn now  to the gap between  income  and expenditure  (savings  and 
investment).  Figure 3 shows the excess of private savings over investment, 
the surplus of the general government budget,  and the current account. 
The pattern of correlation has changed over the last three decades. Until 
the late 1970s, the current account exhibited strong positive correlation with 
the saving-investment balance of the private sector. On the other hand, the 
government  budget  surplus  was  negatively  correlated  with  both  the 
current account  and  the  excess  of  private  savings  over  investment.  In 
contrast, increases in the current account surplus in the 1980s are mirrored 
by sharp reductions in government  budget  deficits-usually  the basis for 
the M-F view of the current account. The gap between  private savings and 
investment  increased slightly in the early 1980s, but the increase is small 
compared with the improvement in the current account. 
Figure  2 NON-OIL  TRADE  BALANCE,  REAL  EXCHANGE  RATE  & U.S.-JAPAN 
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A closer look at the behavior of private savings and investment  (relative 
to GNP) in Figure 4 reveals the following: first, in both the short run and 
long run investment  is more volatile than savings.  Therefore, fluctuations 
in investment  are the major cause of fluctuations in the excess of private 
savings over investment,  and in many cases the current account. Second, 
looking more carefully at investment and savings behavior in each decade 
we  find  that  in  the  1950s and  early  1960s the  excess  of  savings  over 
investment  was  mostly  negative  because  of  the  strong  performance  of 
investment.  The gap started to increase in the late 1960s due to a rise in 
savings, which outpaced investment.  Both savings and investment peaked 
in 1970. Since then, the declines in investment have been much larger than 
those in savings,  explaining the emergence of large gaps between  savings 
and investment.  We may note that this result accords with the predictions 
of the stages-of-the-balance-of-payments theory. (Crowther [1957], Fischer 
& Frenkel [1974].) 
In the 1970s, such a large decline in investment relative to savings would 
have created a large current account surplus. With the exception of 1977- 
78, this did not happen for two reasons. First, there were two large oil price 
increases in the 1970s. Second,  large government  deficits emerged  in the 
late 1970s, partially offsetting the gap between  private savings over invest- 
ment.  In the 1980s the excess of private savings  over investment  did not 
change  much,  while  the  government  deficit  decreased  sharply.  This 
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suggests  a two-way  interpretation of the  current account surplus  in the 
1980s. Relative to the late 1970s, the surplus is most clearly associated with 
the decrease  in the government  budget  deficit. However,  relative to the 
early 1970s, the  sharp decrease in investment  (and a slower  decrease  in 
savings) seems  most significant. This paper is mainly concerned with the 
first of these two interpretations, but the significance of the second should 
not be overlooked. 
We show in Table 1 the behavior of components  of domestic demand for 
the last decade. The table reveals that among the components  of aggregate 
demand,  housing  investment  and  government  expenditures  decreased 
sharply in  the  1980s, with  private consumption  and investment  staying 
mostly at the levels they were in the late 1970s. Comparison of the behavior 
of demand components  with those of net savings indicates that there were 
large increases in taxes in the 1980s, resulting in a much larger reduction in 
government deficits than suggested by government spending movements. 
Net  private  savings  did  not  change  much  because  the  slowdown  in 
housing  investment  was partially offset by a decline in savings. 
To summarize, in terms of exports-imports, the current account has been 
affected by shocks to both exports and imports. Since 1974, however,  the 
significance of oil imports has increased considerably. In terms of income- 
expenditure,  net  savings  have  corresponded  most  with  private  fixed 
investment,  except in  the  1980s when  they  have  been  most  affected by 
government  expenditures  or deficits. 
Figure  4 PRIVATE  SAVINGS,  INVESTMENT  AND NET  SAVINGS 
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Such an overview  suggests  that several key empirical questions  should 
be addressed  in the study of the Japanese current account behavior in the 
1980s. First, does  the correlation between  fiscal policy variables and  the 
current account suggest that the former causes the latter? If it does, what is 
the underlying mechanism that has created the correlation? Second, as this 
must  be  related  to  the  behavior  of  exports  and  imports,  what  is  the 
relationship between  oil imports and budget  deficits? How  and to what 
extent have the expansion  of the U.S. economy  and exchange rate move- 
ments  affected the Japanese current account, savings and investment? 
2. Perspectives  on the  Current  Account 
Let us  now  turn to  a discussion  of  possible  theoretical explanations  of 
recent movements  in the Japanese current account, especially in relation to 
the budget deficit in the 1980s. Before carrying out a detailed analysis of the 
M-F view, we offer a brief review of neoclassical perspectives which tend to 
undermine  the importance of fiscal policy variables. 
2.1 NEOCLASSICAL  PERSPECTIVES 
2.1.1. Fiscal  Policy  and the  Current  Account  In a neoclassical model in which 
agents'  time horizon  is infinite and the government  budget  constraint is 
Table  1  MOVEMENTS  IN THE  COMPONENTS  OF AGGREGATE  DEMAND 
S-I 
FY  Private  Government  C  If  Ih  G  NX 
76-80 
average  4.3  -4.1  58.1  17.9  7.2  15.7  0.4 
81  3.9  -3.7  58.4  19.3  6.0  16.0  0.5 
82  3.4  -3.4  59.5  17.7  5.9  15.7  0.8 
83  5.3  -3.0  59.7  17.4  5.2  15.4  2.0 
84  3.9  -1.8  58.7  17.8  5.0  14.8  3.0 
85  4.2  -0.8  58.0  18.0  4.9  14.5  3.8 
86  4.9  -0.5  57.7  17.7  5.0  14.6  4.6 
87  n.a.  n.a.  57.6  18.0  5.9  14.6  3.8 
Notes: 1.  S-I:  net savings  (savings minus investment). 
C: private consumption. 
If: private fixed investment. 
Ih: private housing  investment. 
G: government  expenditures  on goods  and services. 
NX: current account. 
2. All numbers are relative to GNP. 
3. Components  of demand  do not add up to 100 because inventory investment  is ignored. 
4. Numbers  for 1987 are for calendar year. Japanese  Current  Account  Surplus  *  225 
Figure  5 CONSUMPTION  & INVESTMENT  OF THE  GENERAL  GOVERNMENT 
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internalized by the private sector, some strong conclusions  emerge about 
the effects of fiscal policy on the current account. That is, given the path of 
government spending,  changes in taxes will have no impact on the current 
account because they are offset by changes in private savings.  Permanent 
changes in government spending will be offset by private consumption and 
leave the current account unaffected. Only temporary changes in govern- 
ment spending  will create current account movements.5 
Looking at the components  of government spending in Figure 5, we find 
that there was a permanent increase of about 2 percentage points relative to 
GNP  in  government  consumption  in  the  mid-1970s,  and  a  temporary 
increase (about 1 to 11/2  percentage points) in investment  in 1978-80. By 
1984 government investment was back at the level it was in the mid-1970s. 
Assuming  that all these movements  were foreseen by the private sector, 
we  see  that the  only  significant fiscal policy movement  that might  have 
affected the  current account under  the  Ricardian view  is  the  temporary 
increase  in  government  investment  in  1978 and  1979. This would  have 
created a worsening  of the current account during the same  period  and 
5. Ahmed  [1987] has shown  that both permanent and temporary government  spending  may 
affect the trade balance in a two-country model with endogenous  real interest rates and the 
terms of trade. However,  his results still imply that the effects of permanent changes  in 
government  spending  on the current account are much smaller than those  of temporary 
changes. 226 *  UEDA 
then an improvement in the early to mid-1980s, with the size of the change 
in  the  current  account  falling  short  of  the  changes  in  government 
investment.6 
Such a pattern is consistent  with  the behavior of the current account, 
which worsened  in 1979 and then turned around. But the observed swing 
in the current account is "too" large; in 1979 the current account worsened 
by about 21/2  percent and the improvement toward 1985 is about 5 percent 
(of GNP).  Consequently,  we  may conclude  that, on  the Ricardian view, 
fiscal policy was  not a major cause of the current account surplus in the 
1980s.7 
2.1.2  Prospective Income Changes and  the  Current Account  Prospective 
changes  in future incomes  are generated not only by fiscal policy move- 
ments,  but also by a variety of shocks,  such as improvements  in produc- 
tivity or large changes in factor prices. A prospective income increase will 
stimulate consumption  today and lead to a current account deficit. If the 
income increase is accompanied by an upward revision of the rate of profit, 
this will  stimulate investment,  as well,  and would  create an even  larger 
current account deficit. 
Table 2 presents the results of a survey on expectations of future income 
growth that was carried out by the Japanese Economic Planning Agency. 
The survey asks executives of major corporations what their expectations of 
the average growth rate of real GNP are for the next three years. The table 
shows  that expectations of GNP growth have declined steadily over the last 
two decades; they decreased sharply in 1974-75, then stayed in the 5.0-6.0 
percent range for the rest of the 1970s and the early 1980s, until settling 
down  to the 3.5-4.5  percent range for the 1982-86 period. 
Do such movements  in the expectations of future incomes conform to the 
long-run  behavior  of  savings  and  investment,  as  surveyed  in  the  last 
section? The private investment series depicted in Figure 4 exhibits a sharp 
decrease (relative to GNP) in the mid 1970s and a small decrease in the early 
1980s, which  coincides with  the timing of the downturns  in the expecta- 
tions of income growth. However,  the decrease in investment  in the early 
1980s is mostly a result of a slowdown  in housing investment.  It is not clear 
to what extent this can be explained by changes in the expectation of future 
incomes. 
An  expectation  of a permanent  decrease in the growth  rate of income 
6. This is because changes  in government  spending  are partially offset by changes in private 
consumption. 
7. The large U.S.  government  deficits in the  1980s have  mainly resulted from decreases  in 
taxes. According to the Ricardian  view, this should not have had important current account 
consequences.  See Poterba and Summers [1987]. Japanese  Current  Account Surplus *  227 
Table  2  EXPECTATIONS  OF GNP GROWTH 
Average 
Time  of  of 
Survey  Answer  Actual 
1966.10  10.7  11.1 
1974.3  6.4  2.0 
1975.1  5.3  4.3 
1976.1  5.4  5.1 
1977.1  6.0  5.3 
1978.2  5.8  4.9 
1979.1  5.5  4.4 
1980.1  5.1  3.7 
1981.1  5.2  3.3 
1982.1  4.5  3.8 
1983.1  3.7  4.3 
1984.1  4.3  4.1 
1985.1  4.5  3.8 
1986.2  3.8  ... 
Notes:  1. The survey  is carried  out by the EPA. 
2. The actual  means  the average  of ex-post  three-year  growth  rates,  including  the year  of survey. 
leads to an increase in savings out of current income in the short-run. This 
is because  consumption  declines  as a result of a decrease in permanent 
income.  According  to  this  explanation,  the  savings  rate  would  have 
increased  in  the  mid-1970s  and  early-1980s.  Figure  6  presents  a  few 
measures of national savings rates. None of them show a sharp increase in 
the mid-1970s, contradicting the prediction. There is some upward move- 
ment in the savings rates in the mid-1980s. But this fails to coincide with the 
timing of the downturn  in expectations of future incomes.  Other determi- 
nants  of savings  in neoclassical models  include  the interest rate and the 
stock of wealth.  Ex-post real interest rates on  major saving  instruments 
have shown no sign of a steady decrease for the last decade and a half, with 
the exception of a sharp, but brief decrease in 1974 due to a large surge in 
the rate of inflation that followed  the first oil shock. 
Stock of wealth held by households  has actually increased steadily over 
time. The sum of financial and non-financial wealth relative to trend GNP 
was  2.4  in  1970,  2.9  in  1975,  and  3.5  in  1980.  This  may  explain  the 
downward  trend of saving rates.8 However,  Sato [1986] has shown,  using 
household  survey  data  on  savings,  that  savings  rates  are much  more 
8. Hayashi [1986] suggests the importance of this factor in the analysis of the Japanese savings 
rate. 228  UEDA 
Figure  6 ALTERNATIVE  SAVING  RATES 
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strongly correlated with the desired stock of wealth,  than with the initial 
stock of wealth.  Clearly, more research needs  to be carried out before we 
can pin down  the relationship between  savings and wealth. 
We may note  that the failure to find a major factor which  might have 
created sharp decreases in saving rates in the mid-1970s means  we  must 
reject the  Ricardian neutrality theorem.  The Japanese budget  deficit in- 
creased sharply in the mid-to-late 1970s because of a rise in spending  and 
a decrease in tax revenue.  With the exception of the temporary increase in 
government investment,  this would have increased, rather than decreased, 
private savings rates.9 
In sum,  such  a perspective  fails to adequately explain the behavior of 
savings  and  investment,  especially  savings.  Also,  its  applicability and 
usefulness  for  the  1980s  are  limited.10 Finally,  expectations  of  future 
incomes  are  endogenous  variables  themselves,  requiring  explanation. 
9. Estimation of the consumption  function (to be carried out later) also rejects the neutrality 
theorem. See footnote 31. 
10. One might argue that in the 1980s an expectation of a rise in future productivity in the U.S. 
increased  investment  and  decreased  savings  in  the  U.S.,  while  exerting  the  opposite 
effects abroad. However,  no major surge in U.S. productivity has yet been observed.  See 
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Among  others,  movements  in  oil  prices  seem  to  be  one  of  the  most 
important factors behind  prospective change in future incomes.  Thus, in 
the next section we reexamine the neoclassical perspective, focusing on the 
relationship between  oil prices, savings and investment. 
2.1.3  Oil Prices, Savings and Investment  The effect of oil price changes  on 
savings and investment might be interpreted in the following way: a rise in 
oil prices acts like a decline in productivity, and decreases investment  and 
the  growth  rate of  income,  while  increasing  savings.  However,  in  the 
short-run, people  may regard the increase in oil prices as temporary and 
hence  respond  to it by decreasing the savings rate.1' 
Such a view helps to explain why the savings rate did not increase along 
with the increase in oil prices in the 1970s. At the same time, however,  it 
presents  a number of difficulties. First, the survey data in Table 2 shows 
that the  changes  in the economic  growth  rate in the  1970s were  largely 
considered to be permanent. In particular,  it would be difficult to argue that 
the second  increase in oil prices was  regarded at that time as transitory, 
given  that labor accepted a decrease in real wages  for fear of increasing 
unemployment.12 
Second,  there does  not seem to be an established view  on the relation- 
ship between  oil prices, productivity and investment.  For example,  given 
appropriate  separability assumptions  among  factors of  production,  the 
effects  of  oil  prices  on  investment-including  the  distinction  between 
permanent  and temporary changes-should  be captured by estimating a 
Tobin's q type investment  function. However,  the performance of such an 
equation is notoriously bad.13 
Bruno [1984] provides evidence in support of the idea that oil prices exert 
strong  effects on  productivity: he  shows  that factor price frontiers were 
shifted by the oil price changes in the 1970s. Table 3 is an attempt to extend 
this analysis to include data from the 1980s. In the table, the profit rates of 
the manufacturing sector and the total private sector are explained by the 
real wage rate, a linear time trend, and real oil prices where a one-year lag 
11. As Sachs  [1981]  has shown, a permanent  increase  in oil prices  decreases  both income  and 
consumption,  exerting  only a small impact  on the current  account.  To the extent that 
investment  declines  in response  to a permanent  rise  in oil prices,  the current  account  may 
improve.  (Investment  may increase  under putty-clay  technology.  See, for example,  van 
Wijnbergen  [1984].)  A temporary  increase  in oil prices  creates  small  impacts  on consump- 
tion and investment,  and therefore  leads to a worsening  of the current  account. 
12. See, for example,  Shinkai  [1981]. 
13. Hayashi  [1986]  presents  an estimate  of Tobin's  q  type  investment  function  for  the  Japanese 
manufacturing  sector.  The constructed  q series  is much too high compared  with the level 
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Table  3  FACTOR  PRICE  FRONTIER  1967-1987 
(2)  (4)  (6) 
All  All  All 
(1)  Non-  (3)  Non-  (5)  Non- 
Manuf.  financial  Manuf.  financial  Manuf.  financial 
w/p  -1.02  -0.586  -1.15  -0.57  -0.997  -0.449 
(-2.83)  (-1.83)  (-3.43)  (-2.04)  (-3.49)  (-1.85) 
(po/p)(-1)  -0.337  -0.222  -0.182  -0.116  -0.205  -0.13 
(-1.94)  (-2.28)  (-1.04)  (-1.23)  (-1.39)  (-1.61) 
t  0.0237  0.00457  0.0784  0.0398  0.0453  0.0208 
(1.05)  (.307)  (2.36)  (2.10)  (1.49)  (1.18) 
t  D74  -0.0421  -0.0304  -0.0224  -0.0197 
(-2.11)  (-2.53)  (-1.23)  (-1.79) 
y/y  6.07  3.6 
(2.76)  (2.65) 
R2  0.75  0.714  0.792  0.783  0.853  0.843 
D.W.  1.61  1.54  1.69  1.62  1.41  1.27 
S.E.  0.177  0.113  0.162  0.0984  0.136  0.0839 
Notes:  1. Dependent  variables  are  operating  profits  (obtained  from  MOF)  divided  by the real  capital  stock 
at beginning  of period  (obtained  from  EPA)  times  the WPI  of investment  goods. 
2. The notations  are  p:  the GNP  deflator  (equations  2, 4, 6) and the WPI  of manufactured  goods (1, 
3, 5) w:  nominal  wage index  for  manuf.  and all non-financial  corporations,  PO:  unit  value  of raw 
materials  and fuels imports,  D74:  dummy  taking  one after  1974,  y/y is real  GNP over trend  real 
GNP. 
3. T-statistics  are shown in parentheses. 
is introduced for the oil price variable to allow for a lag in the adjustment 
of inputs  to oil price changes.14 
Equations  (1)  and  (2) are  close  to  the  Bruno  result  except  that  the 
coefficient  on  the  time  trend  is  insignificant.  However,  most  of  the 
explanatory  power  of  the  oil  price  variable  comes  from  the  1974-75 
experience.  Once a dummy  is included in the time trend to allow for an 
exogenous  slowdown  in the rate of productivity growth after 1974, equa- 
tions (3)-(6), the oil price variable turns insignificant. 
So, the case for relating the Japanese productivity slowdown  to oil prices 
is rather  weak. At least, there seems to be no solid evidence that there existed 
a relationship between  oil prices and profits rates for the post-1975 period. 
The finding  of no relationship may be due to a problem with  the data 
and/or statistical methods used here. For example, it is rather puzzling that 
the rise in oil prices in 197980  appears to have had no significant effects on 
profits. One  possible explanation could be that because of lags in adjust- 
14. Without the lag,  the results are even  less  favorable to the presence  of the effects of oil 
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ment, investment did not respond immediately to the rise in oil prices; only 
as the adjustment period was approaching its end were oil prices starting to 
decline. Therefore, no major effects on investment were observed. This also 
explains why investment did not increase in response to the decrease in oil 
prices in the early to mid-1980s.15  Also, given the large temporary movement 
in oil prices from the late 1970s to mid-1980s, people may be responding very 
slowly  to the sharp fall in oil prices in 1986. Such a possibility, however, 
cannot be examined until more observations become available. 
In any case, we shall proceed on the assumption that investment was not 
much affected by oil prices in the 1980s, but that it might have been in the 
mid-1970s, and that it may well be again in the near future. 
To summarize,  although  they provide useful insights  into some  of the 
individual episodes,  neoclassical perspectives fail to give a coherent expla- 
nation of the behavior of savings and investment. 
2.2 MORE  TRADITIONAL  PERSPECTIVES  ON 
SAVING-INVESTMENT  MOVEMENTS 
We  now  move  to  the  examination  of  saving-investment  movements  in 
more  traditional  Mundell-Fleming  type  macro  framework,  where  the 
emphasis  is on the effects of fiscal policy. Ueda  [1985], Masson & Knight 
[1987] both  employ  a two,  or multi-country, full-employment  models  in 
which real interest rates and exchange rates clear the goods markets. They 
also  study  the extent  to which  fiscal policy movements  in the  U.S.  and 
Japan can explain current account behavior. They both find that consumer 
behavior is pretty far removed  from the Ricardian world  and  that fiscal 
policy movements  exert dominant effects on current accounts.  Sachs and 
Roubini [1987] reach a similar conclusion  using  a global macroeconomic 
simulation model,  which is closer to the original M-F model. 
The essence  of the models  may be simply stated in the following  way: 
Consider  a two  country world  in which  domestic  and foreign assets  are 
perfect substitutes,  capital mobility is perfect and  Ricardian equivalence 
does  not hold.  The equilibrium conditions of such a world are: 
y  -  E(y,  e, r, Z1) =  NX  (e, y, y*, Z2)  (i) 
y  -  E* (y*, e, r*, Z1*) =  -NX  (e, y,  y*, Z2)le  (ii) 
r=  r*,  (iii) 
15. Assumption  of adjustment lags would necessitate an explanation of the sharp slowdown 
in investment in the early 1970s, which did not exclusively rely on the rise in oil prices. For 
example,  Yoshikawa and Ohtake [1987] argue that the major cause of the slowdown  in 
Japanese economic growth was a decrease in the flow of population from rural to urban 
areas, which decreased the demand  for the output of construction-related industries. 232- UEDA 
where y is real income, E is domestic absorption, e is the real exchange rate, 
r is the real interest rate, Z1 are exogenous  variables affecting E, NX is the 
current account,  Z2  are exogenous  variables affecting NX,  and  foreign 
variables are denoted  with  a  star. Under  a  classical formulation  (Ueda 
[1985] and Masson & Knight [1987])  y and y* are assumed equal to their full 
employment  values. Then, the goods market is equilibrated by movements 
in e and r. If, in addition, the terms of trade effect on spendings  are absent 
(Ee =  E  =  0), we  obtain the strong conclusion  that Z2 will not affect the 
current account. The current account is determined entirely by movements 
in Z1 and Z1. 
The empirical procedure followed  in these works (Ueda and Masson & 
Knight) involves the estimation of E and E*  functions and full-employment 
values  of  y  and  y* in  order to  find  out  exogenous  movements  in  net 
savings.  Ueda  reaches  the  conclusion  that  most  of  the  increase  in  the 
Japanese current account surplus between  1980 and 1984 is structural, i.e. 
that  it  corresponds  to  movements  along  the  equilibrium  of  the  above 
model,  and that about two thirds of it can be explained by the behavior of 
fiscal policy in Japan and the U.S.,  with each contributing about the same 
magnitude.  We note that most of this literature assumes that the reduction 
in  the  Japanese  budget  deficit in  the  1980s is  for the  full-employment 
deficit. 
This earlier work  is important because  it points  out  the  role of  fiscal 
policy variables in explaining current account movements.  However,  there 
are some  empirical and conceptual problems with these analyses.  First, it 
seems very difficult to obtain a good estimate of full-employment GNP, and 
hence  full-employment  budget  deficits.  In most  cases,  the  full-employ- 
ment, or potential GNP series used,  is not more than a moving average of 
the actual GNP series.  In Figure 7, we  depict the behavior of the unem- 
ployment rate, the capacity utilization ratio in manufacturing, and the ratio 
of job offers to applicants in Japan in order to examine the degree of cyclical 
fluctuations of the economy  in the 1980s. The two labor market variables 
show  that the Japanese labor market was far from full-employment  in the 
1980s. The capacity utilization rate is  slightly better, but its movements 
seem somewhat biased because of high export performance in the 1980s. In 
any  case,  the  figure  suggests  that  we  should  pay  more  attention  to 
short-run, Keynesian-type  considerations. 
Second,  in  much  of  this  work  the  mechanism  by  which  fiscal policy 
affects the  current account is not  carefully analyzed.  Going  back to the 
model (i)-(iii), we note that a domestic fiscal expansion creates a worsening 
of the current account through its effect on the exchange  rate. A foreign 
fiscal  expansion  improves  the  current  account  through  exchange  rate 
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Figure 7 UNEMPLOYMENT RATE, JOB OFFER-APPLICANT  RATIO & CAPAC- 
ITY UTILIZATION  RATE 
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higher  interest  rates.  Consequently,  the  presence  of  strong  effects  of 
exchange  rates  on  trade  flows  and  of interest  rate effects  on  net  savings  are 
crucial  in  the  full-employment  version  of  the  model.16  However,  this 
assumption  is  either  not  checked  at all  (Ueda),  or assumed  to  begin  with 
(Sachs-Roubini).17 
Third,  despite  the  strong  correlation  between  oil imports  and  the  current 
account  in  Japan,  this  work  pays  very  little  attention  to  the  effects  of  oil 
prices. 
Fourth,  the  mechanism  by  which  the  Japanese  budget  deficits  were 
reduced  in  the  1980s  is not  carefully  analyzed  in these  papers.  As  we  saw 
in  Table  1, reductions  in the  deficits  came  more  from  increased  taxes  than 
from  declines  in  expenditures.  Yet,  there  were  no  major  attempts  to 
increase  taxes  during  this  period.18 
These  points  will  be  addressed  in  the  following  study  of  the  Japanese 
current  account  surplus  in  the  1980s. 
16. Under  a Keynesian  interpretation  of equations  (i)  and (ii),  y and  y*  are  endogenous  and the 
usual income-expenditure  mechanism  works to equilibrate  the goods markets. 
17. The Masson-Knight  paper estimates some of the parameters,  but assumes that the 
parameters  are the same across  countries.  Therefore,  it is not clear  to what extent their 
estimates  are good representations  of the working  of individual  countries. 
18. The Ueda paper  does estimate  a full-employment  budget  deficit  series,  but suffers  from  a 
rather  mechanical  choice of the full-employment  GNP series. The Sachs-Roubini  paper 
does have a tax function  in the model, but it does not use the function  to analyze the 
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3. Econometric  Analysis  of the  Japanese  Current  Account 
3.1. THE ELASTICITIES  APPROACH 
3.1.1 Trade  Flow Equations  We first estimate export and import equations 
in a traditional form in order to assess quantitatively the effects of income, 
exchange  rates and  other prices on  the  trade balance.  No  attempts  are 
made to look for "best possible" specifications. Export and import volumes 
are related to expenditures  (of the purchaser) and relative prices. Annual 
data are used to minimize the number of lags in the equations.  (However, 
the results from using quarterly data were not much different from those 
presented  here.) 
Table 4 shows  export price and volume equations. Exports are disaggre- 
gated by region-the  U.S.,  South East Asia, and Europe-for  the purpose 
of paying attention to the special importance of goods exported to the U.S. 
in the  1980s. Expenditure and price variables are a weighted  average of 
Table 4  EXPORT  EQUATIONS 1970-1987 
Dependent  variable 
Quantity  of exports 
Independent  variable  and  South East  Export 
summary  statistic  U.S.  Asia  Europe  price 
Foreign real expenditure  3.04  0.952  4.01 
(21.3)  (22.4)  (15.7) 
Real exchange rate sum  1.17  0.798  0.448  0.389 
Lags: 0  0.696  0.798  0.389 
(4.58)  (4.12)  (6.00) 
1  0.461  0.448 
(2.58)  (1.88) 
Unit Labor Cost  0.72 
(13.3) 
R2  0.99  0.979  0.972  0.948 
S.E.  0.569  0.0642  0.0731  0.0446 
D.W.  2.66  1.44  0.78  1.65 
Notes:  1. T-statistics  are shown in parentheses. 
2. Variables  for the volume equations  are:  export  volume:  nominal  value of exports  divided by 
Japanese  export  price  index (Bank  of Japan)  real  expenditure:  C+ I+G for the U.S., weighted 
average  of GDP of Germany,  France,  and the U.K., with the weights reflecting  the share in 
Japanese  exports, and real GDP of Korea  for South East Asia, real exchange  rate:  p.p.I. for 
manufactured  goods relative  to Japanese  export  price  for the U.S., Korean  unit value  of exports 
relative  to Japanese  export  price  for  South  East  Asia,  and a weighted  average  of German,  French 
and the U.K. export  unit values  relative  to Japanese  export  price. 
3. The  dependent  variable  in the price  equation  is export  price  divided  by the GNP  deflator.  The  real 
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Table 5  IMPORT VOLUME EQUATIONS 1970-1987 
Elasticity 
Raw Materials  Manufactured 
Foods  and Fuels  Goods 
Japanese  real expenditure  1.33  0.673  1.98 
(19.2)  (8.11)  (8.82) 
Real  exchange  rate  sum  -0.137  -0.425  -0.479 
Lags: 0  -0.137  0.0236  -0.479 
(-2.18)  (0.716)  (-1.8) 
1  -0.115 
(-3.18) 
2  -0.931 
(-4.93) 
3  -0.338 
(-1.12) 
4  -0.124 
(-0.589) 
5  -0.551 
(-1.43) 
6  -0.139 
(-3.2) 
R2  0.977  0.837  0.965 
S.E.  0.041  0.0303  0.0835 
D.W.  1.08  2.27  1.6 
Notes:  1. T-statistics  are shown in parentheses. 
2. Japanese  real  expenditure  is real  consumption  plus investment  plus government  expenditures. 
3. Real  exchange  rates  are  the unit  value  of imports  relative  to WPI  of domestic  goods for  foods and 
manufactured  goods equation,  and relative  to the GNP  deflator  for the raw materials  and fuels 
equation. 
those  of Germany, France, and the U.K. for Europe and Korea for South 
East Asia.  In 1985, the share of these  three regions in receiving Japanese 
exports was  70.4 percent. 
Export price is assumed to respond to the competitor's price (represented 
by the U.S.) and unit labor cost. In the equation, both export price and unit 
labor cost are measured  relative to the economy  average in order to take 
account  of  the  faster  productivity  growth  in  tradables  than  in  non- 
tradables.19  The prices of imported intermediate goods were also tried as an 
independent  variable, but turned out to be insignificant. 
Estimates of import volume equations are presented in Table 5. Imports 
are  disaggregated  into  foods,  manufactured  goods  and  intermediate 
19. See, for example,  Marston  [1986]  for the importance  of this effect. 236  UEDA 
Table  6  ESTIMATES  OF LONG-RUN  INCOME  AND PRICE  ELASTICITIES  OF 
JAPANESE  TRADE 
Income  Price 
Exports  Imports  Exports  Imports 
This study  2.68  1.04  0.92  0.41 
(1.87)  (1.19) 
EPA  1.56  1.18  1.38  0.32 
MCM  2.0  1  1.4  0.5 
OECD  1.1  1.18  1.28  0.66 
Notes:  1. Numbers  in parentheses  use the export  volume  equation  reported  in f.n. 21. 
2. Estimates  of the EPA,  MCM  and OECD  models  are taken  from  Amano  [1988]. 
goods.20 (The shares of these in 1985 were 25.4 percent, 41.6 percent, and 
33.0 percent,  respectively.)  The income  elasticity, on  average,  is  almost 
one,  but  falls  far short  of  the  income  elasticities  of  exports.  The  price 
elasticities are also estimated to be much lower than those for exports. 
There is a substantial lag in the effects of prices on intermediate goods 
imports. This creates a J-curve effect, given the large share of intermediate 
goods imports. The simple sum of export and import price elasticities is .69 
in the first year, violating the Marshall-Lerner  condition. Even the sum of 
long run elasticities is fairly small and not far above unity. 
It would  be appropriate to compare our estimates with  those  of other 
studies.  Table 6 presents  the estimates of price and income  elasticities of 
three large macro models  compared with  ours.  The income  elasticity of 
exports in our model is much higher with price elasticity lower. The high 
income  elasticity in the  export equation  suggests  the possibility  that the 
income variable is proxying for the effects of other variables. In fact, when 
the  consumption  of  consumer  durables  and  investment  in  equipments 
replaces the domestic  expenditure variable in the equation for exports to 
the U.S.,  the income elasticity declines and price elasticity increases.21  The 
estimates then are not much different from those of the others. 
20. The quantity of imports of intermediate goods  has been  created by  taking a weighted 
average of the quantities of raw materials and those of fuels with the weights  fixed at the 
1980 shares in imports. 
21. The estimated equation is: 
log(Qus) =  -10.2  +  .921 e +  .749 e(-1) 
(4.64)  (3.08) 
+  .678 log(CD) +  .835 log(IE), 
(1.97)  (2.83) 
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3.1.2  Sources  of Trade  Balance  Movements  The estimates in Tables 4 and 5 
may now be used to perform some accounting exercises. In Table 7, this is 
done  by asking what the contributions of the major variables were when 
the trade balance exhibited large swings in the last decade and a half. The 
specification of trade equations  in Tables 4 and 5 means  that the move- 
ments  in  the  trade  balance  may  be  broken  down  into  the  effects  of 
expenditure  growth  (domestic and foreign), the real exchange  rate (U.S. 
prices over Japanese GNP deflator), relative unit labor costs in Japan, oil 
price relative to U.S. prices, and other export and import prices in dollars 
relative  to  U.S.  prices.  Table 7  shows  only  the  effects  of  expenditure 
growth,  the  real  exchange  rate,  and  oil  price.22 The  others  were,  on 
average,  small in magnitude.  Numbers  presented represent the effects of 
changes  in these  variables (from the end of one period to the end  of the 
next period) on the trade balance, both in real yen  (measured relative to 
Japanese  trend  GNP)23, and  in  real dollars  (measured  relative  to  U.S. 
prices). 
The first point to note from the table is that the Japanese trade balance 
movements  in the 1981-85 period were dominated by domestic and foreign 
expenditure  growth  and  oil prices. The effects of the real exchange  rate 
were,  although  non-negligible,  much  smaller. This conclusion  does  not 
change  much  as export price elasticity increases from .92 to 1.19, as the 
numbers in parentheses  indicate. The expenditure and oil price variables 
together explain more than the actual increase in the trade balance, both in 
yen and dollars, with the contribution of expenditures  slightly larger.24 
The insignificance of exchange rate effects is easily explained by the small 
price elasticities. Oil prices exert large effects on the trade balance because 
of small price elasticities of oil imports. The expenditure variables tended to 
create surpluses mainly because of the large difference in the elasticities in 
the export and import equations, and the high growth of U.S. expenditures 
in this period. 
Where Qus is Quantity  of exports  to the U.S., e is the real exchange  rate, CD is real 
consumption  of durables,  and IE  is real  investment  in equipment.  Note that most of the 
Japanese  exports  to the U.S. fall into either  the CD or IE  category. 
22. In calculating  the effects of the relative  prices between U.S. and Japanese  goods, we 
assume  that  the relative  prices  among  U.S., German  and Korean  goods are  constant.  This 
may be somewhat restrictive,  but relaxing  this will not change the simulation  result 
substantially. 
23. The trend  GNP series  is constructed  in the same way as the potential  GNP series  for the 
U.S. by de Leevu & Holloway  [1983].  The midpoint  of each expansion  is first  identified 
and then these are interpolated  geometrically.  We do not pretend that this is a good 
approximation  of potential  GNP. This is why we do not construct  a full-employment 
budget deficit  series  later  in the paper. 
24. German  and Korean  export  unit values (in dollars)  were falling  relative  to U.S. prices 
during  this period,  which explains  part  of the descrepancy  between  the sum of exchange 
rate, expenditure  and oil price  effects  and the actual  change  in the trade  balance. 0o 
c 
Table 7  SOURCES OF CHANGES IN THE JAPANESE TRADE BALANCE 
In yen  In dollars 
Exchange  Expen-  Oil  Exchange  Expen-  Oil 
rate  diture  price  rate  diture  price 
NX/Y  effects  effects  effects  NX/eP*  effects  effects  effects 
1973-74  -2.6  -0.8  0.7  -3.7  -66  -22  26  -117 
1975-77  2.2  -0.2  2.1  1.1  80  1  77  36 
1977-80  -2.3  -1.1  0.3  -1.5  -81  -24  22  -56 
1981-85  4.1  0.8  3.3  2.6  165  23  151  98 
(1.1)  (34) 
1986-87  -0.2  -2.3  1.1  0.8  122  -5  96  51 
(-3.0)  (-50) 
1986  0.5  -1.4  0.7  0.9  125  32  55  60 
(-1.7)  (14) 
1987  -0.7  -0.9  0.4  -0.1  -3  -37  41  -9 
(-1.3)  (-64) 
Notes: 1. Numbers show changes from period before. Those in yen are in %, i.e. relative to trend GNP, while those in dollars are realtive to P*, the PPI of U.S. manufactured 
goods  (1967= 100). 
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Comparing the 1981-85 period with the others, we find that movements 
in oil prices accounted  for most  of the fluctuations in the trade balance, 
followed  by  the  movements  in  expenditures.  Exchange  rate  changes 
exerted the smallest effect, but were in no way negligible. For example, the 
sharp appreciation of the yen in the late 1970s and the 1985-87 period had 
a fairly substantial impact on the trade balance. The reason for the small 
effect of real exchange rate changes in the 1981-85 period, apart from the 
small price elasticities of trade flows,  is that the depreciation of the yen in 
this period was relatively moderate.25  It was large when compared with its 
previous  peak in 1978, but was not relative to the 1979 or 1980 levels. 
This result implies that the usual M-F type interpretation of the current 
account behavior in the 1980s has overemphasized  the role of exchange rate 
changes in the effects of fiscal policy internationally. It has placed too little 
importance on the traditional income-expenditure  mechanism and on the 
effects of oil prices. 
3.1.3 The 1986-87 Period  The persistence of large trade imbalances in the 
face of large corrections in exchange rates since  1985 has attracted wide- 
spread attention. Table 7 makes clear why  the Japanese trade surplus has 
not  decreased  substantially.  Despite  the  small price elasticities of  trade 
flows,  exchange rate changes  during this period has substantially affected 
the trade balance. This is certainly because  the size of the exchange  rate 
change was  unprecedentedly  large. 
The fact that the surplus did not decline in 1986 can be explained by the 
large decrease in oil prices and a continued high growth of U.S.  expendi- 
tures (3.8 percent) relative to Japanese expenditures (4.1 percent). The two 
more than offset the effect of the yen  appreciation. In 1987 the situation 
changed dramatically:  there were no further decreases in oil prices, and the 
U.S.-Japan expenditure growth differential declined  sharply. U.S.  expen- 
ditures  grew  only  at  2.4  percent,  while  Japanese  expenditures  at  5.0 
percent. For the first time since 1982 the differential was  a large negative 
number. Consequently,  the trade surplus relative to GNP decreased fairly 
sharply in response  to the further appreciation of the yen. The decrease in 
25. Perhaps those who argue that exchange rate effects were quite large are implicitly 
measuring  the effects  relative  to the case in which the dollar  appreciated  much earlier  in 
response to the build-up of massive trade-deficits.  We might also note that had the 
exchange rates moved in larger  amounts (in the right direction)  each time the trade 
account  recorded  a large  imbalance,  we would not have seen such large swings in the 
trade  balance.  In simple equilibrium  open economy models, quantity  variables  such as 
income and expenditures  matter  much as if domestic and foreign goods are perfect 
substitutes.  Our  analysis  has shown that,  despite  small  elasticities,  the effects  of quantity 
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the surplus in dollars is smaller due to a J-curve type effect created by the 
presence  of the initial surplus.26-27 
3.1.4 Implications  for Exchange  Rate  Movements  The low price elasticities of 
trade flows  imply  that exchange  rates must change by large amounts  to 
generate  a large reduction  in  the  trade imbalances.  But by  how  much? 
Using the elasticities in Tables 4 & 5 it is possible to calculate the future path 
of the Japanese trade balance under alternative exchange rate scenarios. 
Relying  mostly  on  December  1987  OECD  forecasts  of  expenditure 
growth  to  1 percent for the  U.S.  and 3 to 4 percent for Japan, we  have 
carried out such calculations. A constant rate of 127.9 yen per dollar-the 
rate as of January 1988-until  1990 will create a cumulative decrease of the 
Japanese trade surplus of about 10 billion dollars. A constant rate of 100 yen 
per dollar will increase this by 5-10 billion dollars and the Japanese trade 
surplus in 1990 will be about two-thirds of what it is now. 
This is certainly a very pessimistic  result once  one  recognizes  that the 
service account will be  increasing at a very rapid rate as a result of the 
accumulation of net foreign assets. However,  it would be a bad mistake to 
assume that price elasticities will stay low when the yen hits the 80 yen per 
dollar level. After all, the real exchange rate of tradables is now only slightly 
higher than the 1980 level.  (See Figure 3.) It is also important to note the 
danger of focusing too much on exchange rate movements.  The foregoing 
analysis indicates that a small change in expenditure variables would wipe 
out the effects of a large change in exchange rates. 
3.2 ABSORPTION  APPROACH 
3.2.1  Saving and Investment  Equations  We now  take a look at the compo- 
nents of aggregate demand in order to find major determinants of saving- 
investment  movements.  Table  8  presents  estimation  results  of  fairly 
conventional  consumption  and  investment  equations.  Equations  are all 
estimated by OLS, but the use of instrumental variables estimators to take 
account  of  the  endogeneity  of  some  of  the  variables  did  not  change 
26. The degree of improvement of the trade balance caused by an exchange rate depreciation 
is proportional to the sum  of export and import price elasticities minus  one,  assuming 
initial balance of the trade account. However,  Japanese exports were  1.517 times larger 
than the imports in 1985. Simple calculation reveals that the improvement  of the trade 
balance from an exchange  rate depreciation is proportional to .53 in yen,  while  propor- 
tional to .19 in dollars. 
27. It would  be interesting to see whether equations that have been estimated for up to 1985 
inclusive could track the 1986-87 period well. This exercise has been carried out with no 
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Table 8  CONSUMPTION AND  INVESTMENT  EQUATIONS 
C/W  Ih/Kh  If/Kf 
(1960-85)  (1970-86)  (1970-86) 
1/W  -189  const.  -0.452  const.  0.786 
(-3.97)  (-7.87)  (2.52) 
const.  2.09  i-Ph  -0.000105  QIK  0.171 
(8.05)  (-3.35)  (2.68) 
PR/W  0.647  NII(Ph. Kh)  0.0561  cost  -0.00039 
(8.17)  (10.7)  (-2.39) 
TIW  -1.46  P20  1.56  t  0.00905 
(-4.84)  (7.59)  (6.84) 
GW  -0.11  t  D74  -0.00232 
(-1.44)  (-2.82) 
P40  -9.25  ln(PO/P)  -0.0064 
(-4.60)  (-.954) 
P60  9.68  ln(W/P)  -0.193 
(3.83)  (-2.91) 
S.E.  0.0229  0.00696  0.0042 
D.W.  1.67  2.35  1.62 
R2  0.959  0.989  0.988 
Notes:  1. T-statistics  are shown in parentheses. 
2. Variables  from  NIPA  are all in billions  of yen or 1980  yen. 
3. Notations  are C:  consumption,  W;  Total  wage payment,  T:  taxes  net of transfers  and interest  on 
government  bonds, GW:  growth  rate  of wages over 5 years,  P40:  share  of 40-59 years  old, P60: 
share of 60 years old and over, Ih: real housing investment, Kh:  real stock of housing, i: 
government  bonds  rate,  Ph:  deflator  for  Ih,  P20:  share  of 20-39  years  old, If:  real  fixed  investment, 
Kf:  real  capital  stock,  Q:  gross  output,  cost:  cost  of capital,  t:  linear  time  trend,  PO:  import  price  of 
fuels, P: GNP deflator. 
coefficients  estimates  very  much.28 The  sample  period  is  the  same  as 
export-import equations, with the exception of the consumption  equation, 
for which  the use of demographic variables required a longer sample.29 
The  consumption  equation  is  of  the  life-cycle  theory  type  whereby 
28. For example,  the investment  equation suffers from the endogeneity  of gross output.  The 
result of an instrumental variable estimator using the gross output net of investment as an 
instrument is: 
If/Kf  =  1.06 +  .114 Q/Kf -  .000411 cost +  .0096 t 
(2.82)  (1.50)  (-2.84)  (6.52) 
-  .00275 t D74 -  .00222 In (POIP) -  .250 In (W/P), 
(-3.10)  (-.319)  (-3.16) 
which  is  not  much  different from the  equation  in  Table 8.  However,  given  the  small 
sample size, it is not clear whether use of instrumental variables estimator gives us better 
results. 
29. Unfortunately,  1986 and  1987 observations  of some  of the variables in Table 8 became 
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aggregate consumption  depends  not only on current income, but also on a 
long-run  growth  rate of  real wages  and  variables representing  the  age 
structure of the population.  Current income is divided into wages,  profits 
and taxes (net of transfers) to allow for differences in the perception of the 
permanentness  of each component  of income. 
It is fairly well known that household  saving rates do not differ much by 
age in Japan.30  However,  on closer inspection,  the saving rates of house- 
holds whose  head is between  40 and 60 years old are higher than those in 
other age brackets. The reported saving rates of households  whose  head is 
more  than  60 years  old  are not  much  lower  than  those  of  the  others. 
However,  the work of Ando (1984) has shown  that this may be due to the 
presence of a large number of old people who live with their children and 
are not counted as old households,  but in fact save much less than younger 
people. 
The  estimated  consumption  function  supports  the  prediction  of  the 
life-cycle theory. The propensity to consume profits is smaller than that for 
wages,  an  increase  in  the  share  of  40-59  years  old  decreases,  and  an 
increase  in  the  share  of  60 years  old  and  over  increases  consumption. 
Higher  growth  of  wages  decreases  consumption.  Some  rate  of  return 
variables on savings were tried, but they turned out to be insignificant.31 
The  results  have  the  following  implications  for the  long-run  and  for 
recent movements  in consumption and savings. The long-run tendency for 
the  savings  rate to decline is caused by lower economic  growth  and the 
aging of the population.  However,  the latter increased the shares of both 
40-59 year olds and 60-year-olds and over. Therefore, the decrease in the 
savings  rate has been fairly slow  so far.32  The small decline in the rate of 
consumption  after 1983 is explained by increased taxes. 
The second equation relates housing investment  (relative to the stock of 
houses)  to the real interest rate, national income  relative to the  existing 
value of houses,  and the share in total population of those between  20 and 
39 years old, who  are the major purchasers of new homes.33 
30. According to a recent survey of household  savings, the average savings rate of 20-39 years 
old is 16.1 percent, that of 40-59 years old is 20.2 percent and 60 years old and over, 18.9 
percent. 
31. One  very  simple  test  of  the  Ricardian neutrality  theorem  in  the  context  of  such  a 
consumption  function is to use government expenditure in place of taxes and add budget 
deficits  as  an  independent  variable. Under  neutrality,  the  coefficients  on  the  budget 
deficits and the life-cycle variables would be zero. Estimation of such an equation showed 
that these  were  significant, rejecting the neutrality theorem.  Admittedly,  this is a very 
naive test. But a survey of Bumheim  [1987] points to the same conclusion. 
32. This implies  that as the aging of the population  progresses  the saving rate will decline 
substantially. 
33. A recent study of Japanese housing investment by Takenaka [1987] found this last variable 
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The  results  indicate  that  the  sharp  decline  in  the  share  of  housing 
investment  in GNP in the  1980s was  mainly a result of the aging of the 
population.  The interest rate variable, although significant, exerted a fairly 
small impact on housing  investment; between  1980 and 1985 the decrease 
in the share in GNP of housing  investment  that is due to real interest rate 
movements  is calculated to be at most  .4 percent compared to the actual 
decrease of about 2 percent. 
The equation for fixed investment  reflects a compromise between  neo- 
classical and  Keynesian  considerations.  The determinants  of investment 
may be classified into those  of the rate of profit and those  of the cost of 
capital.  Under  a  neoclassical  view,  the  rate of  profit is  determined  by 
technology  and factor prices; under a Keynesian view,  sales constraints in 
the goods market makes the profit rate responsive to the level of demand. 
The equation contains gross output (nominal GNP plus intermediate goods 
imports  divided  by  the  GNP  deflator) relative to  the  capital stock  as  a 
measure  of demand.  In view  of the  analysis  of the  factor price frontier 
carried out  in  section  2.1.3,  (real) oil  prices,  wages  and  a  time  trend 
interacted with  a post-1974 dummy  have  been  included  as  neoclassical 
determinants  of  the  profit rate. Finally, there  is  a conventional  cost  of 
capital variable.34 
All variables display  the expected  signs  and,  with  the exception  of oil 
price,  are significant.  Exclusion of the  time trend implies  that oil prices 
would  be  significant,  for  some  sample  periods.  However,  for  reasons 
already discussed in section 2.1.3, we shall proceed on the assumption that 
the  time  trend  variable represents  exogenous  changes  in  productivity 
rather than the effects of oil prices. 
The estimation  result reveals that the  slowdown  in investment  in the 
1970s and 1980s is mainly due to the slowdown  in aggregate demand,  to 
increases  in  real wages,  and  to  a  smaller  extent  to  the  slowdown  in 
productivity growth.  In the 1980s the share of investment  in GNP stayed 
approximately constant with the trend increase in productivity, offsetting 
the negative impacts of aggregate demand and real wages.  The coefficient 
on the cost of capital variable suggests  that the rise in the real interest rate 
in the  1980s decreased  investment  by at most  .5 percent in terms of the 
share in GNP. 
The results in Table 8 may be conveniently  summarized as in Table 9 in 
order to  highlight  the  significance  of  some  of  the  determinants  of  the 
34. The cost of capital here is defined  by (r + d)(1 -  uz)/(1 -  u) where  r is the government 
bond rate minus the inflation rate of the deflator for investment,  the depreciation rate d is 
assumed  equal to 10.07 percent, u is the corporate income tax rate, and z is the present 
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saving-investment  balance in the 1980s. The table breaks down  sources of 
savings  and investment  movements  into long-run factors, interest rates, 
and short-run demand movements.  The long-run factors include all demo- 
graphic variables, technology  changes  and relative prices. The short-run 
demand factors include the effects of tax changes on consumption.  We first 
ask what  the level  of saving and investment  would  have been  if certain 
variables had been at their 1980 levels in 1985. We then take the difference 
between  the actual and calculated levels of saving and investment  to infer 
the contribution of the variable, which is reported in the table. Staying at 
the 1980 level means relative to trend GNP for demand variables and capital 
and housing  stocks, and literally at the 1980 level for all others except the 
interest rate. Real interest rates were already high in 1980. Therefore, we 
took the average of the nominal government bonds rate minus the rate of 
increase in the GNP deflator for 1976-80, and applied the actual differences 
in various inflation rates in 1985 to calculate the hypothetical real interest 
rates in 1980. This procedure leads to an overestimation of the effects of 
interest rates. 
The results show  that each of these three exerted a fairly small effect on 
private net savings.  The long-run factors had strong individual effects on 
savings  and investment,  but mostly they offset each other. In particular, 
the  demographic  forces  decreased  housing  investment,  but  increased 
consumption,  leaving  net savings  approximately unaffected.  The magni- 
Table  9  SOURCES  OF CHANGES  IN NET  SAVINGS  BETWEEN  1980  AND 
1985 
Long-run  Interest 
factors  rate  Demand  Actual 
S  -1.3  -0.2  -1.4 
If  0  -0.3  -0.5  -0.8 
Ih  -1.9  -0.3  -0.1  -1.9 
S-If-Ih  0.6  0.6  0.4  1.3 
T  1.9 
G  -1.5 
G-T  3.4 
NX  4.7 
Notes: 1. Long-run factors include  changes  in the age  structure of populations,  productivity,  real wage 
growth and all other relative price changes. 
2. The effects of demand  on savings include those of tax changes. 
3.  T is taxes net of transfer payments  and interest on government  bonds.  G is consumption  and 
investment  of the general government.  NX is the current account. 
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tude  of  interest  rate effects on  investment  is  small  to  begin  with.  The 
stagnant  behavior  of  domestic  demand  affected  fixed  investment  ad- 
versely,  but this is not a particularly large effect, either. 
To summarize,  there does  not  seem  to have been  large shocks  to the 
private net savings in the 1980s.35  Specifically, the small interest rate effects 
again cast doubt on the notion that the effect of assets prices on the goods 
market is the most important mechanism behind the effects of fiscal policy 
on the current account.36 
The  table presents  the  changes  in  government  balances,  as  well,  for 
comparison.  It shows  that the  contribution the  decrease  in government 
expenditures  alone has made to national net savings  is larger than those 
factors that have affected private net savings. Moreover, as was pointed out 
previously,  the increase in tax revenue  was larger in magnitude  than the 
decline  in  government  expenditures.  This requires explanation  because 
there were  no large changes  in the tax structure during this period.37 A 
natural interpretation would  be that the average tax rates moved  up as a 
result of economic growth.38 However,  I have just shown  that there were 
no large scale stimulus on the domestic side of the goods market. In the last 
section,  it was pointed out that the expansion of demand in the U.S.  and 
35. Absence  of strong  effects  of oil prices  on expenditures  implies  that  a decrease  in oil prices 
will increase  income and savings. This is not particularly  evident in Table  9 because a 
significant  portion  of the increase  in income went into increased  taxes and it was the 
government  who increased  savings. 
36. A most serious  objection  to such a conclusion  would be the following:  suppose the typical 
M?F view was the correct  model of the world. If the U.S. fiscal  expansion  and Japanese 
contraction  exerted  about the same order  of effects  on the interest  rate, the interest  rate 
would move very little  and we would obtain  almost  exactly  the same result  as in Table  9. 
However, even in this case, the current  account should move mainly in response to 
exchange  rate  changes  under  the M-F  view. We have  just seen that  this was not the case. 
37. There  was a small  decrease  in the corporate  income  tax  rate  of about  3 percentage  points. 
Given the share of corporate  income, the effect  of this tax increase  would have been at 
most .3 percent  of GNP. There  were also some increases  in individual  commodity  tax 
rates.  But  the taxes  from  those commodities  (for  which the tax  rate  has increased  in many 
cases)  actually  declined. 
38. One very simple  way to measure  the progressivity  of taxes  is to linearize  the relationship 
between taxes and income for small changes in incomes. The following  tax function  is 
used in the simulation  exercise  to be reported  below: 
(total  tax revenue)/GNP  = .2359  -  12591  (1/GNP), 
(31.3)  -7.76) 
R2=  .857, 1975-86. 
This is in fact shows that the average  tax rate increases  with economic  growth. Such a 
result  is less clear  when pre-1974  observations  are incladed  due to a number  of tax cuts 
that were carried  out in the high growth period. The results that came from a more 
complicated  model of tax collection  were not very different  from those reported  in the 
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the decreases in oil price provided large favorable shocks to the Japanese 
goods  market. Thus,  I will now  turn to an analysis of the relationship of 
U.S. expansion, the decrease in oil prices, the Japanese government budget 
deficits, and the current account. 
3.2.2  U.S.  Expansion,  Oil Prices, the Japanese  Budget Deficits and the Current 
Account  The relationships between these variables have been analyzed by 
the  conventional  income-expenditure  approach.  That  is,  we  used  the 
behavioral equations estimated in previous sections to infer the multipliers 
that can be applied to various exogenous  shocks. Admittedly, this is a very 
crude approach to the problem. However,  given the relative unimportance 
of the  effects of asset  prices,  the  analysis below  might  provide  a useful 
upperbound  of the effects of the shocks on the goods  market. 
First, it is necessary to quantify the exogenous  shocks.  Concerning the 
U.S. economic expansion,  I take the baseline case to be the growth of U.S. 
domestic  expenditures  at  an  annual  rate  of  2.5  percent,  which  is  the 
average for the 1970s, compared with the actual of 3.4 percent for the 1980- 
86 period.  The difference is taken to be the shock provided  by the  U.S. 
economic  expansion.  We  then  assume  that  the  German  and  Korean 
expenditures  are affected according to the multipliers in the  EPA world 
econometric model-.49  for Germany and 1.5 for Korea. The elasticities in 
Table 4 are used  to calculate the changes in Japanese exports.39 
The  shock  created by  the  decrease in oil prices is assumed  to be  the 
difference between  actual oil imports and those that would have prevailed 
if oil prices had stayed at the 1980 level relative to U.S.  prices. Elasticities 
estimates in Table 5 are used  to calculate the change in oil imports. 
It might also be interesting to analyze the impacts of real exchange rate 
movements  and the Japanese fiscal contraction. For the real exchange rate, 
the baseline case is, again, a constant real exchange rate at its 1980 level. In 
the  absence  of  fiscal  contraction,  I  assume  that  the  ratio  of  Japanese 
government  expenditures  to  trend  GNP  would  have  stayed  at its  1980 
level. 
The goods  market equilibrium condition is gross output (GNP plus raw 
materials and fuels imports) equal to the sum of consumption,  investment, 
government  expenditures  and  non-oil  trade balance.  I assume  that the 
GNP deflator is not affected by the experiment. Change in tax revenue  is 
calculated by the tax functions presented in Footnote 38. 
The results of such an exercise are summarized in Table 10, where  the 
39. It is assumed that exports to regions other than the U.S., South East Asia, and Europe stay 
constant.  In this  sense  the  effects of U.S.  economic  expansion  is somewhat  underesti- 
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Table 10  SOURCES OF TRADE BALANCE AND  BUDGET DEFICIT 
CHANGES 
Government 
budget  Trade  Initial 
surplus  balance  shock 
Actual  -0.8  3.8 
U.S.  expansion  -1.8  2.8  -1.4 
Oil price decrease  -2.0  2.3  -1.9 
Real exchange rate change  -1.2  3.4  -0.6 
Japanese fiscal contraction  -1.4  3.2  1.6 
Notes:  1. The first  two columns  show budget  surplus  and trade  balance  relative  to simulated  GNP in the 
absence  of the shocks. 
2. The third  column  indicates  the size of the initial  shock  relative  to trend  GNP. 
size  of the  shock  (relative  to actual  GNP),  the  levels  of government  budget 
surplus,  and  trade  balance  (relative  to the  simulated  GNP)  in the absence of 
the  shocks  are  shown.  The  initial  impacts  on  the  Japanese  goods  market 
happen  to be  approximately  the  same  for U.S.  expansion,  oil price  change 
and  the  Japanese  fiscal  contraction.  The  effects  of the  U.S.  expansion  and 
oil  price  decrease  are  similar  if  allowance  is  made  for  the  impact  of  the 
former  to be  underestimated.  The  effects  of  the  absence  of Japanese  fiscal 
contraction  are smaller.  The  small  effect  on  the  trade  balance  is due  to the 
small  income  elasticity  of  imports.  The  effect  on  the  budget  deficit  is  also 
small,  more  or less  because  of the  increase  in  GNP.40 
The  result  allows  us  to explain  the  increase  in the Japanese  trade  surplus 
in the  1980s  as follows:  The  U.S.  expansion,  the  decrease  in oil prices,  and 
the Japanese  fiscal contraction  explain  about  three  fourths  of the increase  in 
the  surplus.  The  rest  is explained  by  exchange  rate changes  and  other  less 
important  shocks.  To  the  extent  that  the  U.S.  economic  expansion  and 
dollar  appreciation  and  possibly  higher  real  interest  rates  in  Japan  are 
attributable  to  U.S.  fiscal  expansion,  the  effects  of  U.S.  fiscal  policy  have 
been  larger  than  those  of Japanese  fiscal  policy.41 
The Japanese  budget  deficit  decreased  by  about  4 percent  of GNP  in the 
first half  of the  1980s.  Table  10 shows  that  somewhere  between  two-thirds 
40. For example,  the effects on the nominal government  deficit are about the same between 
U.S.  economic  contraction and Japanese fiscal expansion.  But the latter increases GNP, 
resulting in a smaller deficit relative to GNP. 
41. Of course, this depends  on the choice of the baseline. A higher U.S. expenditure growth 
than 2.5 percent in the baseline case makes the simulated effects smaller. On the other 
hand, an assumption of zero growth in U.S. expenditures would have produced almost no 
decrease in the Japanese budget deficit and a minor increase (about 1 percent of GNP) in 
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and  three-fourths  of  this came  from foreign shocks,  and  the  remainder 
from  the  decline  in  Japanese  government  expenditures.  Previous  re- 
searches seem to have underestimated the endogeneity  of the movements 
in the  deficit,  and  therefore overestimated  the impact of Japanese fiscal 
policy  on  the  trade  balance.  In  the  1980s  foreign  shocks  were  more 
fundamental and the Japanese budget deficit decreased largely in response 
to these. 
3.3 THE  1986-87  PERIOD 
As has been pointed  out, the 1986-87 period has seen  some tendency  for 
the current account surplus to decline. The interpretation of this from the 
current account side has been given in section 3.1.2. Let us now relate it to 
developments  on the saving-investment  balance side.42 
Some information on the recent behavior of savings and investment  has 
already been  summarized  in Table 1. Clearly, the increase in the current 
account surplus in 1986 is mainly associated with an increase in private net 
savings  (relative to GNP). This is primarily a result of a decrease in both 
fixed  investment  and  consumption.  Investment  declined  heavily  in  the 
manufacturing sector, reflecting the effects of a sharp appreciation of the 
yen  and  a resulting  decline  in exports.  The decrease in consumption  is 
more  difficult  to  explain.  A  careful look  at  the  data  on  consumption 
suggests  that real consumption  in 1986 was increasing at a higher rate, 3.6 
percent,  than real GNP,  2.6 percent.  Thus,  the decrease in the  share of 
consumption  comes  entirely  from a  lower  growth  of  the  consumption 
deflator-.1  percent, than the GNP deflator-1.5  percent. Essentially, this 
is a terms of trade effect; people were saving the increase in income arising 
from the yen appreciation and the decrease in oil prices.43 
Consequently,  the  behavior  of  net  savings  in  1986 continued  to  be 
dominated  by  shocks  to the current account.  However,  unlike in earlier 
periods in the 1980s, private net savings increased, rather than government 
savings.  This was  due to a very low growth rate of nominal incomes; the 
growth rate of nominal GNP was lowest  in the last two decades. 
In 1987 private investment,  both residential and non-residential,  pulled 
the economy  out of the mild recession of 1986 and produced a decline in 
the current account surplus.  It is difficult at this stage to make a proper 
account of this increase in investment.  It might mean  that the period of 
stagnant investment  which lasted for more than a decade is now  over. If 
this is the case, the current account surplus will decline substantially in the 
42. Moriguch  [1988]  makes  a similar  point in a less formal  way. 
43. An inclusion  of import  prices  in the consumption  function  reported  in Table  8 produced 
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near  future,  given  that  the  life-cycle  theory  interpretation  of  savings 
suggests  that consumption  will also be increasing as the population ages. 
An alternative interpretation is that the boom in investment  is a lagged 
response  to the increase in income generated by the yen appreciation and 
to the decline in oil prices. Although we have rejected the idea of a strong 
correlation between  investment  and oil prices, especially for the early to 
mid-1980s,  it is  entirely  possible  that the  correlation is  stronger  over  a 
broader time frame. In this case the boom in investment will be short-lived 
and declines  in the current account surplus in the near future will not be 
very large. 
4. Recapitulation  and Some  Further  Considerations 
4.1 RECAPITULATION 
The foregoing discussion  has been aimed at two objectives. First, we have 
tried to  examine  the  correlation between  fiscal policy  variables and  the 
current account  in  the  1980s in  a  longer-term  perspective  in  order  to 
appreciate the special problems in the 1980s. Second, we have carried out 
a somewhat  detailed short-run analysis of the 1980s to find out the source 
of the correlation. 
To summarize our major findings on the first objective, we pointed out 
that the  Ricardian view  of  the  world  may  not  be  very  realistic because 
consumption  does  not move  as theory predicts. However,  in connection 
with  current account  movements,  we  saw  that investment  had  become 
more important and that the relative stability of private investment  in the 
1980s has created the strong connection between  the current account and 
movements  in the budget deficits. In previous periods, private investment 
dominated  the  behavior  of  total net  savings  and  therefore  the  current 
account.  (Figure 4.) It is important to note that the Japanese government 
budget  deficit moved  by a larger amount in the 1970s than in the 1980s. 
(Figure 3.) Despite this, the increase in the budget deficit in the late 1970s 
was associated with an increase in the current account surplus. The reason 
is  simply  that the  major shock  was  a slowdown  in investment  and  the 
budget  defict was a response  to it. 
The stability of private investment  in the  1980s reflected that of fixed 
investment.  A potential source of instability in fixed investment  was  the 
behavior of oil prices. The increase in oil prices in 1979-80 might have led 
to a sharp decrease in investment  in the early 1980s, followed  by a sharp 
recovery as oil prices started to decline  in the early 1980s. This did  not 
happen  and possible reasons why  not were discussed  in section 2.1.3. 
Turning to the analysis of the 1980s, we have pointed out that the usual 
M-F  view  somewhat  overemphasized  the  role  of  asset  prices  in  the 250 *  UEDA 
transmission of the effects of fiscal policy. The importance of the traditional 
Keynesian  income-expenditure  mechanism  has  been  found  to  be  non- 
negligible. A corollary to this has been the finding that the reductions in the 
Japanese  budget  deficits  were,  to  a great extent,  a response  to  foreign 
shocks-the  increase in U.S. budget deficits and declines in oil prices. To 
say the least,  attempts of the Japanese fiscal authority to cut the budget 
deficits have been successful because of the favorable foreign shocks. 
4.2 JAPANESE  TRADE  BARRIERS  AND THE  CURRENT  ACCOUNT 
One popular explanation of the Japanese current account surplus empha- 
sizes  the importance of Japanese trade policies and barriers, which  have 
promoted  exports and restricted imports. It may be appropriate to com- 
ment briefly on this. 
Given that the income-expenditure  mechanism has been determined to 
be  important,  a change  in  trade policy-a  change  in  the  Z2 variable of 
equation (i)-does  affect the current account. However,  in order to argue 
that trade policies and barriers played a major role in the increase in the 
current  account  surplus  in  the  1980s,  one  must  show  that  they  have 
increased in importance during the period. This is a hard task to accom- 
plish.  Recent works by a number of authors (including Bergsten & Cline 
[1985] and Saxonhouse and Stern [1987])  have mostly shown  that Japanese 
trade barriers have not been a major cause of the surplus. 
Instead of discussing the importance or unimportance of these intangible 
factors, we will comment briefly on the relationship between  trade policies 
or barriers and  the response  of the Japanese trade balance to the recent 
exchange rate changes. In the last section we found that price elasticities of 
trade flows are fairly low for both exports and imports. Do trade policies or 
barriers play a role here? 
There are various "voluntary" restrictions on exports, which now  affect 
a large portion of Japanese exports. It is easy to argue that exports do not 
respond  to  price changes  when  restrictions are binding.  Although  our 
attempts to find structural changes in export functions were unsuccessful, 
some authors have argued that the restrictions have changed the pattern of 
the responses  exports have to exchange rate changes.  (Fukao & Nakakita 
[1987].) 
Regarding imports, many have expressed concern over the low share of 
manufactured goods imports. This is changing rapidly, as is evidenced  by 
the large income elasticity shown  in Table 3. Manufactured goods imports 
are now  almost  50  percent  of  total imports.  However,  the  small  price 
elasticity is  certainly disturbing.  In Figures 8 and  9 I show  import  and 
domestic prices for those  goods  for which  there are official and unofficial Japanese  Current  Account  Surplus  *  251 
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import barriers and also for other goods.  The former includes such goods 
as  beef,  sugar,  silk  and  canned  fruits.  Clearly,  import  barriers have 
prevented  low  import  prices  from  penetrating  into  domestic  markets. 
Without a doubt this has limited the price response of imports.44  Although 
it is hard to quantify the macroeconomic significance of such effects, this 
point  will  have  to  be  addressed  in  future  studies  of  Japanese  imports 
behavior. 
In sum,  trade barriers may have limited the response  of trade flows  to 
exchange rate changes.  However,  the burden is on both sides-Japan  and 
foreign countries-to  lift such barriers and increase price elasticities. 
4.3 THE  ROLE  OF CAPITAL  FLOWS 
As an accounting identity, a large current account surplus corresponds to 
a large capital outflow. To the extent that capital outflows in the 1980s have 
been  a response  to  the  current account  surpluses,  there  are no  further 
problems to analyze.  However,  there are reasons to believe that a certain 
autonomous  element  has existed  in the Japanese capital outflows  in the 
1980s. 
44. Lawrence  [1987] carries out  a  detailed  analysis  of Japanese  imports  of  manufactured 
goods.  He concluded  that although the effect mentioned  does  occur, it is less important 
than other intangible barriers, and the price elasticity of manufactured goods imports are, 
on average, higher than ours. Our result may well suffer from aggregation biases. 252 *  UEDA 
In Figure 10 we show the behavior of the current account, the long-term 
capital account, and foreign exchange market intervention by the monetary 
authority. The pattern of correlation among the three has changed over the 
last decade and a half. In the 1970s current account surpluses corresponded 
first to large foreign  exchange  market interventions  and,  with  a lag,  to 
increased long-term capital outflows.  In contrast, in the early to mid-1980s 
long-term  capital outflows  were  larger than the current account surplus 
and, to some extent, preceded the increase in the current account surplus. 
Ueda [1987] has provided the following interpretation of such a pattern. 
In the 1970s capital outflows  were  mainly responding  to current account 
surpluses.  Thus, emergence  of a current account surplus created a strong 
pressure for the yen to appreciate. This led to massive interventions by the 
authority, which was trying to prevent large changes in the exchange rate. 
As  the  appreciation of the  yen  hit its peak,  the  expectation  of a future 
depreciation takes over, which in turn stimulates capital outflows. 
The source of capital outflows  in the 1980s is quite different. A simple 
regression analysis indicates that there were three major factors behind the 
large capital outflows in the 1980s:  increases in foreign (relative to domestic) 
interest rates; large money  flows  into institutional investors,  whose  pro- 
pensity to hold foreign assets is higher than others, and relaxation of capital 
controls which had previously placed severe restrictions on the amount of 
foreign  assets  the  institutional  investors  held.  The  first  two  may  be 
Figure  9 IMPORT  AND DOMESTIC  PRICE  INDEXES  ITEMS  WITHOUT  IMPORT 
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considered  as a response  to other shocks,  such as domestic  and foreign 
fiscal policy. However,  the third is certainly an autonomous  development 
on  the  capital account  side.  Ueda  finds  that  the  relaxation of  controls 
played a major role in the sharp rise in capital outflows  in the mid-1980s 
when  the U.S.-Japan interest rate differential was no longer increasing. 
Such  an  account  of  the  behavior  of  the  capital account  in  the  1980s 
suggests  that had it not been  for the rapid relaxation of controls and the 
resulting increase in the demand for U.S. assets by the Japanese, the yen 
would  have started to appreciate at a much earlier stage.45 Although  our 
analysis has emphasized  the weak impact of exchange rate changes on the 
current account,  large enough  changes  in the exchange rate would  have 
certainly checked the increase in the current account surplus. 
5. Concluding  Remarks 
The major conclusions  of the paper may be summarized as follows: 
(i) The movements  in the Japanese current account in the 1980s corre- 
45. Sachs & Roubini, op. cit. reaches a similar conclusion. 
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spond to two important developments  in domestic saving and investment 
balances.  First, private investment  (relative to GNP) has decreased  more 
sharply than savings since the early 1970s, creating a large excess of private 
savings over investment.  Second, the large government budget deficits in 
the 1970s, which mostly offset the private net saving, virtually disappeared 
in the 1980s. This paper is mainly concerned with the interpretation of this 
second  correspondence. 
(ii) Neoclassical  perspectives  which  emphasize  the Ricardian neutrality 
theorem  or prospective  changes  in future incomes  and productivities do 
not seem  to be useful  for interpreting the second  correspondence,  while 
they may be useful for understanding  the first. Even in that case it would 
be  the  behavior  of  investment  that is  crucial for understanding  current 
account movements.  The absence of strong effects of oil prices on invest- 
ment in the early to mid-1980s created stability of fixed investment,  which 
in  turn increased  the  correlation between  fiscal policy  and  the  current 
account. 
(iii) Estimates of price elasticities of trade flows and interest rate elastic- 
ities of domestic  expenditures  are fairly low,  suggesting  some  modifica- 
tions  to  the  popular  Mundell-Fleming  type  interpretation  of  the 
correspondence  between  fiscal policy and the current account. 
(iv) Major shocks to the Japanese goods  market in the 1980s were U.S. 
economic  expansion,  decreases  in oil price and the  decrease  (relative to 
GNP) in Japanese government expenditures. During the period of 1980-85, 
the three exerted roughly the same degree of effect on the Japanese trade 
balance through conventional income-expenditure mechanism, and in total 
explain most of the increase in the surplus during the period. 
(v) The decrease in the Japanese budget deficits in the 1980s was partly 
a result of the slow  growth of expenditures,  but more importantly was  a 
response  to the U.S. economic expansion,  oil price decrease, and to some 
extent,  the  dollar appreciation as  these  increased Japanese income  and 
taxes. In this sense, previous researches have overemphasized the effects of 
Japanese fiscal policy on the current account. 
(vi) The 1986-87 experience is also explained in our framework. In 1986 
the  sharp decrease  in  oil prices continued  to  dominate  the  behavior  of 
current account and saving-investment  balance, but with a larger effect on 
private net savings than on the budget deficit. It is still premature to judge 
whether  the surge in private investment  in 1987 signals the resurgence of 
a strong correlation between  investment  and the current account. 
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Comments 
SUSAN M. COLLINS 
Harvard  University/NBER 
This paper addresses  an interesting and important topic-the  large Japa- 
nese current account surplus. The subject is of particular  interest for at least 
two reasons.  The first is that the global current account imbalances are at 
the  center  of  a heated  international policy  debate.  On  this  side  of  the 
Pacific, we are familiar with the ongoing  protectionist pressures to reduce 
the U.S. deficit. The second reason is that these persistent imbalances have 
raised provocative theoretical and empirical questions about, for example, 
the role of exchange rates in external balance adjustment. 
This paper seeks to examine one aspect of this broad issue.  It asks why 
exchange  rate  swings  have  not  reversed  the  Japanese  current account 
surplus,  and what role fiscal policies have played. 
Using  standard macroeconomic accounting identities,  the paper docu- 
ments the major developments  on the trade side (imports and exports) and 
on the sectoral balance side  (savings and investment).  Out of this docu- 
mentation it reaches two central conclusions.  First, it is claimed that most 
of the Japanese current account surplus can be attributed to the Japanese 
fiscal contraction, the U.S.  fiscal expansion,  and the decline in oil prices. 
This conclusion is relatively uncontroversial and, as the paper points out, 
is consistent with the findings of many other studies. 
The second  central conclusion  is that foreign shocks were  much  more 
important than the Japanese fiscal contraction in explaining the Japanese 
external surplus. I was very surprised, in fact, to read that other research- 
ers, such as Sachs and Roubini (1987) have overstated the role of Japanese 
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the U.S. deficit. The second reason is that these persistent imbalances have 
raised provocative theoretical and empirical questions about, for example, 
the role of exchange rates in external balance adjustment. 
This paper seeks to examine one aspect of this broad issue.  It asks why 
exchange  rate  swings  have  not  reversed  the  Japanese  current account 
surplus,  and what role fiscal policies have played. 
Using  standard macroeconomic accounting identities,  the paper docu- 
ments the major developments  on the trade side (imports and exports) and 
on the sectoral balance side  (savings and investment).  Out of this docu- 
mentation it reaches two central conclusions.  First, it is claimed that most 
of the Japanese current account surplus can be attributed to the Japanese 
fiscal contraction, the U.S.  fiscal expansion,  and the decline in oil prices. 
This conclusion is relatively uncontroversial and, as the paper points out, 
is consistent with the findings of many other studies. 
The second  central conclusion  is that foreign shocks were  much  more 
important than the Japanese fiscal contraction in explaining the Japanese 
external surplus. I was very surprised, in fact, to read that other research- 
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fiscal policy because of their failure to endogenize  government  revenues. 
Government  revenues  are  certainly  endogenous  in  the  multi-country 
simulation  model  used  by  Sachs and  Roubini.  So is  the  exchange  rate, 
which is treated exogenously  by Ueda. In any case, their simulations imply 
that  the  contraction  in  Japanese  fiscal  policy  is  not  that  important  in 
explaining  the  U.S.  current  account  deficit.  However,  it  is  the  most 
important factor in explaining the Japanese current account surplus during 
1980-1985, accounting for a shift of nearly 2 percent of GNP. 
In general, it was not clear to me exactly what position was being taken 
about the role of fiscal policies in the U.S. and Japan. The main problem is 
that the paper often did not specify which time period was being discussed, 
and  I do  not believe  one  can get a handle  on  this issue  without  paying 
careful attention to time period. 
The paper begins by claiming that "popular" explanations of the imbal- 
ances (which emphasize  fiscal policies) seem  to explain the course of the 
world  economy  in the 1980s fairly well-except  for exchange  rate move- 
ments since 1985. Thus, exchange rates and other asset prices are taken as 
exogenous.  However,  this does  not solve the problem. Most of the other 
empirical work I have  seen  suggests  that there were  also shifts in goods 
markets in the mid-1980s. 
The remainder of my comments will address two issues. First, I will spell 
out the "popular" view about the role of fiscal policy in explaining external 
balances, suggesting  that this view adequately explains those balances for 
1979-85, but not  for the  years that follow.  Second,  I will briefly outline 
some recent suggestions  to explain post-1985 developments. 
Because it will be familiar to many on this side of the Pacific, it is helpful 
to begin by summarizing the "fiscal policy story" from the U.S.  perspec- 
tive.  Krugman (1987b) provides  a more extensive  discussion  of the  key 
points.  In a nutshell,  the  story is that the rise in the U.S.  budget  deficit 
contributed to a decline in domestic savings relative to investment,  putting 
pressure  on  real interest rates in the U.S.  These  factors led  to a foreign 
capital in  flow  and  to  a  real exchange  rate appreciation.  The  external 
current account deficit is the counterpart to the capital account surplus. 
The  parallel "fiscal policy  story" for the Japanese  1979-85 experience 
would  go as follows.  The episode  begins with an increase in the govern- 
ment budget  surplus.  As described by Sato (1988), the reduced  expendi- 
tures stemmed from concern over Japan's ability to weather future external 
shocks following  the experience with the second  oil price rise. This fiscal 
policy shift contributed to a rise in the national savings-investment  gap. A 
key part of the story is the Japanese liberalization of international capital 
movements  in  1980. Thus,  in response  to the fall in real rates of return 
relative to those abroad (i.e.,  in the U.S.),  there was a massive  outflow  of 258  COLLINS 
capital from Japan and  a  real exchange  rate depreciation.  The  external 
current account surplus offset Japan's capital account deficit. 
However,  this  story  works  considerably  less  well  in  explaining  the 
post-1985 experience. In particular, we have seen persistent fiscal deficits in 
the U.S.  and surpluses  in Japan, large reverse exchange rate swings  and 
sluggish  adjustment  of current account imbalances.  Should  we  attribute 
these  developments  to  shifts  in  behavior  since  1985? Or has  the  story 
always been more complex,  so that the simple explanations for the earlier 
period are misleading? 
To my mind, the recent developments  are the most interesting aspects of 
current account behavior. Therefore, I was disappointed that Ueda's paper 
did not attempt to compare or contrast them with the earlier period. In fact, 
as was  mentioned  before, the paper is often unclear about exactly which 
period  is  being  discussed.  This  is  a  more  serious  problem,  because  it 
confuses  the key issues. 
I was also very surprised to learn that none of the regression equations 
showed  evidence  of a structural shift after 1984. Most other studies I have 
seen do. For example, simulations from the Federal Reserve Board and the 
McKibbon-Sachs  multi-country  models  track well  pre-1985,  but  show 
growing  divergences  afterwards. (See Hooper and Mann, 1987 and Sachs 
and Roubini, 1987.) Loopesko and Johnson (1987) find evidence of shifts in 
Japanese import and export volume and export price equations. Since Ueda 
does  not  provide  statistical tests,  plots  of  residuals  or  other  relevant 
information, it is difficult to tell how  his results might be different. In any 
case,  the  question  of  structural shifts  warranted  further  analysis  and 
discussion. 
There is a growing literature which does offer explanations for the long 
lags  in  recent  trade balance adjustment  to  exchange  rate changes.  The 
issues  raised  in  that work  seem  central to  any  discussion  of  the  large 
Japanese surplus. However,  they are not mentioned here. In the remainder 
of my comments,  I will touch on a few relevant points. 
A number of authors have concentrated on the pass through of exchange 
rate changes to prices of Japanese exports. Although pass through seems to 
have been about 100 percent during 1974-79 (Moriguchi, 1987), it seems to 
have fallen considerably since then. Loopesko and Johnson (1987) report an 
average pass  through  of just 47 percent from February 1985 to February 
1987. For some commodities,  they find the pass through to be as low as 10 
percent. 
Hooper  and  Mann  (1987)  have  emphasized  the  behavior  of  profit 
margins. They find that Japanese producers have squeezed margins during 
the  1985-87 yen  appreciation.  These  observations  raise the  questions  of 
whether  further yen  appreciation will  result in  greater pass  through  to Comment  259 
prices,  and  presumably  to  a  reduction  in  Japanese  exports  once  profit 
margins have fallen far enough. 
In addition to these empirical studies,  there is some interesting theoret- 
ical work.  A number  of authors have  examined  firms' pricing decisions 
under  different  market  structures.  For example,  Krugman  (1987a) and 
Dorbusch  (1987) point  out  that  exchange  rate changes  may  alter the 
elasticity of demand  and therefore the prices of foreign producers. Others 
have focused on intertemporal issues,  either on the supply side (Krugman, 
1987a) or on the demand  side (Froot and Klemperer, 1988). 
In summary, this paper has not changed my view that fiscal policies, in 
Japan as well as in the U.S., go a long way in explaining the current account 
developments  through the mid-1980s. However,  the real puzzles appeared 
more  recently,  and  this  paper  has  not  helped  me  to  understand  the 
experience since 1985. 
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diture effects of fiscal policy are placed at the center of the explanation. 
Supply side considerations are basically shunned  from the analysis, as are 
elements  of the new  classical macroeconomics. 
Table 1 might  be  used  to show  the  Ueda  position:  the  change  in  the 
current account is roughly of the same order as that in the budget.  Both 
investment and saving do change, but the changes offset each other at least 
partially. Hence the budget change stands out as the major event. 
In my comments I will raise two issues: First, how would one tell a story 
of  the  Japanese  external balance  when  supply  considerations  are  also 
relevant?  Second,  what  are the  structural factors playing  a role  in  the 
development  of the Japanese external balance? 
Trade  Flows 
We briefly review here the trends in the Japanese external balance. Figure 
1 shows  net exports as a fraction of GDP, using  national income account 
definitions.  The basic pattern of surplus is only interrupted by the two oil 
shocks.  The role of oil in Japan's external balance is apparent from these 
numbers: between  1972 and 1974 the share of oil in imports rose from 17.6 
percent to 36.4 percent.  From 1976 to 1978 it further increased from 32.3 
percent  to  41 percent.  By 1986 the  share of  oil was  down  to  only  18.8 
percent.  Changes  in  oil  prices  thus  play  a  central  role  in  explaining 
movements  in the external balance. 
The long-run trend in the external balance is compared in Table 2 to the 
same  data  for  three  other  countries:  the  U.S.,  Germany,  and  Korea. 
Compared to Germany's stable and steady external surplus, Japan shows 
an emerging  trend toward surpluses.  The U.S. by contrast shows  already 
in the 1970s negative net exports, which  since then have turned sizeable. 
Korea, finally, represents the typical underdeveloped  country that finances 
growth  with  external borrowing  and  then  gradually  evolves  toward  a 
position  of a positive net external balance. 
In writing the story of Japan's external balance, one  question  surely is 
how  important long-run trends are in the current developments  and how 
Table  1  JAPAN:  MACROECONOMIC  AGGREGATES  (PERCENT  OF GDP) 
Average  1981-86  5-Year  Change 
Saving  28.0  -0.7 
Investment  23.3  -1.7 
Budget  -2.5  3.0 
Current  Account  2.3  3.9 
Source:  Chouraqui et al (1987), Table 5. Comment  261 
much  short-run  factors are at work.  A  comparative  evaluation  (with  a 
common  analytical framework) of various countries' trend behavior in the 
external balance might offer an interesting perspective on this question. 
Figure 2 shows  a third view of the Japanese external balance. The figure 
shows  net exports in constant 1980 yen.  Focusing on the trade surplus in 
constant  prices allows  us  to  discern the  ongoing  real adjustments.  It is 
interesting to note that the turn in the trade balance is primarily due to a 
sharp increase in imports. Over the period 1984:4 to 1987:4 export volume 
fell by 0.2 percent, but imports in constant prices rose by 18 percent. That 
is striking evidence  of a major change in Japanese trade flows. 
Ueda argues that relative prices have played a minor role in trade flows, 
spending  changes  have dominated  in his view.  But in my judgment,  his 
analysis does not pay sufficient attention to the structural transformation of 
the Japanese economy  over the past decade. It is apparent that when  one 
allows  for a time trend in a Japanese export equation the trend is highly 
significant  and  quantitatively  important.  The  role  of  foreign  demand 
becomes  significantly  smaller.  For  example,  an  equation  for  Japanese 
export volume to the U.S.,  using quarterly data for the period 1973:1-1987: 
1, shows  the following  results: 
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Table  2  COMPARATIVE  EXTERNAL  BALANCE  TRENDS  (NET  EXPORTS  AS 
PERCENT  OF GDP, NIA) 
1950-59  1960-69  1970-79  1980-86 
Japan  0.1  0.2  0.8  2.3 
U.S.  0.2  0.2  -0.5  -1.8 
Germany  2.7  2.1  2.6  2.5 
Korea  -8.7  -10.1  -5.9  -1.6 
Source:  IMF 
Q =  0.61 -  0.78 PRICE +  0.018 TIME +  1.15 DEMAND 
(0.33)(-3.6)  (6.3)  (3.1) 
R2 =  0.99,  Rhol =  1.22,  Rho2 =  -0.52 
where Q and PRICE  are the logs of export volume and of the relative price 
of Japanese exports to the U.S. producer price of manufactures. DEMAND 
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Figure  3 
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here is proxied by U.S. industrial production. The t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses.  Figure 3 shows  the real price variable used in this regression. 
The significant time trends in the export equation reflects the structural 
transformation of Japan as it becomes  a supplier of high quality manufac- 
tures, from automobiles  and consumer  durables to capital equipment.  A 
simple time trend is a crude way of representing that development,  but it 
certainly dominates  capturing it by the U.S. demand variable.1 
Fiscal  Policy  and The  Real  Exchange  Rate 
The Ueda rendition of the Japanese external balance emphasizes  the impact 
of fiscal developments  in the U.S.  and Japan. In the period  1980-87 the 
cumulative change in cyclically adjusted non-interest budgets was +3.4 for 
1. The equation also fails to pay attention to voluntary export restraints on automobiles and 
other aspects  of a realistic modelling  of trade flows.  It is important to note  that Japanese 
exports to the U.S. are not only affected by the U.S.-Japanese relative price, but also by the 
prices of Japan relative to those of other suppliers including Korea and Western Europe. 264- DORNBUSCH 
Japan and  -1.7  for the United States. These fiscal changes  affect income 
and spending,  and hence trade flows: U.S. fiscal expansion spills over into 
increased imports from Japan, Japanese fiscal contraction slows  down  the 
growth in import demand. 
It is quite plausible that Japanese fiscal policy is endogenous  to interna- 
tional developments:  changes in foreign demand that favor Japanese goods 
are used as an opportunity to achieve fiscal consolidation under conditions 
of full-employment.  A full-employment  model  of the Japanese economy 
makes this point. 
J(g,R) =  0  (1) 
g  = g(R)  (2) 
Let g  be  the  structural (non-interest) budget  deficit in Japan and  R the 
relative  price  of  Japanese  goods.  In  Figure  4  the  schedule  JJ shows 
full-employment  in Japan, given U.S. demand. The schedule gg represents 
the  governments  reaction  function  for  the  budget:  when  the  (full-em- 
ployment)  real exchange rate appreciates fiscal policy is tightened. 
Now  consider  the  consequences  of  a  U.S.  demand  expansion.  The 
increased demand  for Japanese goods  shifts the JJ  schedule up and to the 
Figure  4 
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left to J''.  The new  equilibrium at point  E' involves  a reduction  in  the 
budget deficit and a real appreciation. The budget restraint frees resources 
for export  and  in  this  way  reduces  the  required real appreciation  that 
otherwise  would  occur. 
This  rendition  is  consistent  with  the  broad  pattern  of  the  Mundell- 
Flemming  analysis: real appreciation and current account swings  are the 
counterpart of the demand changes induced by fiscal policy changes.  But 
this story can be told even under conditions of full-employment. 
Even though this rendition captures the broad pattern of changes in the 
real exchange rate and in the current account, it does not take into account 
important structural aspects of the Japanese economy  in the recent past. 
Real  commodity  prices,  including  oil,  are  among  these  and  so  is  the 
increasing trade with South East Asia. 
Structural  Aspects  of the  External  Balance 
Sato  (1988) has  emphasized  a  set  of  factors quite  different from  those 
characterizing the  Mundell-Flemming  model.  He  notes  that the  oil and 
commodity  shocks  of  the  1970's were  viewed  as a national emergency, 
bringing about a major structural adaptation of the economy to compete in 
world  markets,  even  in the face of high  real prices of essential  primary 
commodities.  The  export  drive  in  manufacturing  has  been  one  conse- 
quence and it was built in equal part on cost performance and a drive for 
market access and marketing. On the side of cost reduction labor produc- 
tivity growth was 37 percent over the decade between  1973-78 and 1983-86 
and the gain in energy efficiency amounted  to 64 percent.2 
The sharp decline in the real prices of commodities thus left a structural 
surplus  in an economy  that could not adjust rapidly to an era of cheap 
commodities.  Indeed, with a possibility of a resurgence of high real prices 
the behavior was altogether rational. 
Another important feature in Japanese trade is the new division of labor 
that is  today  emerging  in  South  East Asia.  Under  the  pressure  of  yen 
appreciation, Japanese export industries have had to seek cost reductions. 
Part came from a sharp reduction in domestic labor costs. But an important 
contribution took the form of increased imports from the newly  industri- 
alized countries in South East Asia. There is little doubt that the strong yen 
has  created  the  threshold  effects  for a  substantial  integration  of  these 
economies  into the Japanese export sector and the Japanese economy  at 
large. Table 3 shows  the share in Japanese imports and exports from four 
2. See Yoshikawa (1987). 266 *  DISCUSSION 
Table  3  JAPANESE  TRADE  WITH  4 NICS  (PERCENT  OF TOTAL  JAPANESE 
TRADE) 
1970-79  1980-86  1987 
Exports  13.8  13.9  17.2 
Imports  5.6  6.9  12.6 
newly  industrialized  countries:  Korea,  Taiwan,  Singapore,  and  Hong 
Kong. 
The recent strength of the Yen, relative to the dollar, has surely helped 
develop  this new  division of labor. But it is certain that, once established, 
it will now  develop  much further. 
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Discussion 
Most of the floor discussion took issue with specific assertions made by the 
author or discussants.  Robert Barsky doubted  a point  made  by Rudiger 
Dombush,  that Japan is near full-employment  so the Mundell-Flemming 
model is inappropriate. Barsky claimed that in Japan there is a lot of labor 
hoarding.  Ueda  agreed.  Maurice Obstfeld  was  unconvinced  by  Ueda's 
dismissal of Ricardian equivalence. He noted that Ueda's tests of Ricardian 
equivalence depend  on a very specific set of restrictions with respect to the 
discount and international interest rates, and that a more general rejection 
was  not merited.  Robert Gordon worried that the paper omitted supply- 
side  factors that might be important. He  also wondered  how  to explain 
Japanese firms' ability to cope with large swings in relative prices when  US 
firms have  struggled  with  these  same  swings.  Stan Fischer questioned 
whether Japanese import barriers could be ignored in discussing  the trade 
surplus.  Finally, Robert Hall claimed that the evidence  does  support the 
view that real allocations do depend  on relative prices. He argued that the 
Japanese had purchased a number of goods,  as well as real estate, inside 
the U.S. Martin Feldstein agreed that relative price movements  are impor- Discussion 267 
tant to consider but was  skeptical of Hall's evidence.  The only  recorded 
empirical evidence  on this point,  is Japanese direct investment,  which  is 
relatively small-on  the order of $7 billion. 
Ueda responded  by saying that his model was designed  to explain the 
short-run,  and  over  this  horizon  relative  prices  may  not  be  terribly 
important. 